Cognitive science seeks to understand the mind by integrating findings from such variegated disciplines Bermudez, is available from the campus bookstore. Enter the characters you see below. Sorry, we just need to make sure you're not a robot. Wolfenstein 2009 pc iso complete review. For best results, please make sure your browser is accepting cookies. Cognitive Science is replete with examples. Download PDF (zip). The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution. Contents Preface xv Acknowledgments xxiii 1. Introduction: Exploring Inner Space 1 A Brave New World 1 What Is Cognitive Science? 2 Representation 3. Enter the characters you see below. Sorry, we just need to make sure you're not a robot. For best results, please make sure your browser is accepting cookies.
- Jose Luis Bermudez
Texas A&M University, Liberal Arts, Faculty Member
Texas A&M University, Liberal Arts, Faculty MemberJosé Luis Bermúdez is Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, where he previously served as Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and as Associate Provost for Strategic Planning. Before joining Texas A&M in 2010 he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Center for Programs in Arts and Sciences, and Director of the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis.
Dr. Bermúdez has more than 100 publications, including five single-author books and six edited volumes. His research interests are interdisciplinary in nature at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. His first book, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (MIT Press, 1998) analyzed the nature of self-awareness. Thinking without Words (Oxford UP, 2003) offered a model for thinking about the cognitive achievements and abilities of prelinguistic infants an nonlinguistiuc humans. Decision Theory and Rationality (Oxford UP, 2009) explores tensions in how the concept of rationality is defined and formalized in different academic disciplines. The second edition of his textbook Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind was published by Cambridge University Press in March 2014. He is the editor of the New Problems in Philosophy book series, published by Routledge. Dr Bermudez is currently completing a book on the first person in language and thought, in addition to papers in the philosophy of mind and the theory of rationality.
Dr. Bermúdez has more than 100 publications, including five single-author books and six edited volumes. His research interests are interdisciplinary in nature at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. His first book, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (MIT Press, 1998) analyzed the nature of self-awareness. Thinking without Words (Oxford UP, 2003) offered a model for thinking about the cognitive achievements and abilities of prelinguistic infants an nonlinguistiuc humans. Decision Theory and Rationality (Oxford UP, 2009) explores tensions in how the concept of rationality is defined and formalized in different academic disciplines. The second edition of his textbook Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind was published by Cambridge University Press in March 2014. He is the editor of the New Problems in Philosophy book series, published by Routledge. Dr Bermudez is currently completing a book on the first person in language and thought, in addition to papers in the philosophy of mind and the theory of rationality.
1,211 Followers74 Following—Total Views
This paper develops notions of rationality and reasoning that are both applicable to non-language.. more This paper develops notions of rationality and reasoning that are both applicable to non-language-using creatures and sufficiently robust to underwrite the practice of giving psychological explanations of the behaviour of non-linguistic creatures. In the first section I explain the interdependence of the notion of psychological explanation and the notion of rationality, and show that this interdependence must be understood differently at the linguistic and the non-linguistic levels. In sections 2 to 4 I outline three different levels of non-linguistic rationality. Section 5 explains how from this typology we can derive an account of non-linguistic reasoning.
PaperRank:
It is beyond serious doubt that non-linguistic creatures are capable of thinking and reasoning ab.. more It is beyond serious doubt that non-linguistic creatures are capable of thinking and reasoning about the physical environment in highly sophisticated ways. But can animals think about thinking? Alternatively put, are animals capable of metarepresentation? This question is at the heart of how we think about comparative psychology, animal cognition, and human cognitive development. In Bermúdez 2003 I proposed that certain types of thinking about thinking are only available to language-using creatures. My argument generated interesting debate and useful criticisms that helped me to refine and develop it. This paper reviews the state of play, offering a revised version of the argument that addresses some of the principal objections.
PaperRank:
This paper focuses on areas of interdependence between memory and self-consciousness, primarily i.. more This paper focuses on areas of interdependence between memory and self-consciousness, primarily in the dimensions of epistemology and functional role. In particular –
(1) The role of self-consciousness in memory
(2) The role of memory in self-consciousness
The most relevant type of memory for (1) and (2) is autobiographical memory. Section 2 will clarify the nature of autobiographical memories and judgments based on autobiographical memory. In sections 3 and 4 we will turn to an important epistemic property of autobiographical memory judgments – their immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. Understanding this property is particularly important for understanding the role of self-consciousness in memory. Section 5 explores the relation between autobiographical memory and autobiographical narrative, approaching the issue through a question posed by Bertrand Russell about the perceived pastness of autobiographical memory.
(1) The role of self-consciousness in memory
(2) The role of memory in self-consciousness
The most relevant type of memory for (1) and (2) is autobiographical memory. Section 2 will clarify the nature of autobiographical memories and judgments based on autobiographical memory. In sections 3 and 4 we will turn to an important epistemic property of autobiographical memory judgments – their immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. Understanding this property is particularly important for understanding the role of self-consciousness in memory. Section 5 explores the relation between autobiographical memory and autobiographical narrative, approaching the issue through a question posed by Bertrand Russell about the perceived pastness of autobiographical memory.
PaperRank:
This paper explores some of the areas where neuroscientific and philosophical issues intersect in.. more This paper explores some of the areas where neuroscientific and philosophical issues intersect in the study of self-consciousness. Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, the paper illustrates how the highly conceptual forms of selfconsciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoning and interpersonal psychological interactions. The study of these primitive forms of self-consciousness is an interdisciplinary enterprise and the paper considers a range of points of contact where philosophical work can illuminate work in the cognitive sciences, and vice versa.
PaperRank:
This chapter addresses a theoretical problem that arises when we treat non-linguistic animals as .. more This chapter addresses a theoretical problem that arises when we treat non-linguistic animals as thinkers in order to explain their behavior in psychological terms. Psychological explanations work because they identify beliefs and desires that show why the action in question made sense from the agent’s perspective. To say that an action makes sense in the light of an agent’s beliefs and desires is to say that it is the rational thing to do (or, at least, a rational thing to do) given those beliefs and desires. And that in turn means that, in at least some cases, an agent might reason her way from those beliefs and desires to acting in the relevant way. Most models of reasoning, however, treat it in terms of logical operations defined over linguistic structures, which makes it difficult to see how it might be extended to non-linguistic creatures. This paper develops a framework for thinking about the types of reasoning engaged in by non-linguistic creatures. It explores non-linguistic analogs of basic patterns of inference that can be understood at the linguistic level in terms of rules of inference involving elementary logical concepts. The three schemas discussed (reasoning from an excluded alternative and two types of conditional reasoning) are highly relevant to animal practical reasoning, and I show how animals might apply them without deploying any logical concepts.
PaperRank:
This is the latest revision (August 2015) of our entry on Mental Content, Nonconceptual in the St.. more This is the latest revision (August 2015) of our entry on Mental Content, Nonconceptual in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
PaperRank:
In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with wha.. more In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with what has become close to philosophical orthodoxy – the view, most often associated with John Perry (1979) and David Lewis (1979), that psychological explanations are essentially indexical. Cappelen and Dever claim that claims of essential indexicality are typically driven by intuitions rather than supported by arguments. They issue a challenge to supporters of essential indexicality: Produce an argument to back up the intuitions. This paper answers their challenge.
PaperRank:
This paper explores the connection between two approaches to reasoning and rationality that are g.. more This paper explores the connection between two approaches to reasoning and rationality that are gaining increasing prominence in the cognitive and social sciences. According to the massive modularity hypothesis, the mind is made up of a large number of specialized modules that evolved to deal with highly specific problems confronted by our hominid and pre-hominid ancestors. The theory of fast and frugal heuristics proposed by Gerd Gigerenzer and his collaborators builds upon Herbert Simon’s influential notion of bounded rationality and Simon’s idea that theories of rationality need to be sensitive to the psychology of reasoning and the constraints governing real life and real time decision-making. Both the massive modularity hypothesis and the theory of fast and frugal heuristics are proposed as drastic revisions of widely held views in cognitive science, pointing towards a notion of ecological rationality that can replace the traditional “optimizing” model of rationality. This paper assesses these revisionary claims and finds them to be overstated.
PaperRank:
Forthcoming in the second edition of the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.
PaperRank:
This paper explores and rejects Lewis’s claim that the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem a.. more This paper explores and rejects Lewis’s claim that the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem are notational variants of each other. The first section reviews the prisoner’s dilemma and Newcomb’s problem. Section 2 explores the theoretical background to Lewis’s argument, focusing in particular on how it has been taken to support causal decision theory over standard (evidential) decision theory. Section 3 sets out Lewis’s argument. Section 4 identifies the flaw in Lewis’s argument, while section 5 compares the discussion to discussion of the so-called symmetry argument in favor of cooperating in the prisoner’s dilemma. Section 6 generalizes the discussion by showing that the two problems involve fundamentally different types of reasoning (parametric in one case, and strategic in the other), and hence that the prisoner’s dilemma cannot be a Newcomb’s problem.
PaperRank:
This paper develops notions of rationality and reasoning that are both applicable to non-language.. more This paper develops notions of rationality and reasoning that are both applicable to non-language-using creatures and sufficiently robust to underwrite the practice of giving psychological explanations of the behaviour of non-linguistic creatures. In the first section I explain the interdependence of the notion of psychological explanation and the notion of rationality, and show that this interdependence must be understood differently at the linguistic and the non-linguistic levels. In sections 2 to 4 I outline three different levels of non-linguistic rationality. Section 5 explains how from this typology we can derive an account of non-linguistic reasoning.
PaperRank:
It is beyond serious doubt that non-linguistic creatures are capable of thinking and reasoning ab.. more It is beyond serious doubt that non-linguistic creatures are capable of thinking and reasoning about the physical environment in highly sophisticated ways. But can animals think about thinking? Alternatively put, are animals capable of metarepresentation? This question is at the heart of how we think about comparative psychology, animal cognition, and human cognitive development. In Bermúdez 2003 I proposed that certain types of thinking about thinking are only available to language-using creatures. My argument generated interesting debate and useful criticisms that helped me to refine and develop it. This paper reviews the state of play, offering a revised version of the argument that addresses some of the principal objections.
Luis Bermudez Facebook
PaperRank:
This paper focuses on areas of interdependence between memory and self-consciousness, primarily i.. more This paper focuses on areas of interdependence between memory and self-consciousness, primarily in the dimensions of epistemology and functional role. In particular –
(1) The role of self-consciousness in memory
(2) The role of memory in self-consciousness
The most relevant type of memory for (1) and (2) is autobiographical memory. Section 2 will clarify the nature of autobiographical memories and judgments based on autobiographical memory. In sections 3 and 4 we will turn to an important epistemic property of autobiographical memory judgments – their immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. Understanding this property is particularly important for understanding the role of self-consciousness in memory. Section 5 explores the relation between autobiographical memory and autobiographical narrative, approaching the issue through a question posed by Bertrand Russell about the perceived pastness of autobiographical memory.
(1) The role of self-consciousness in memory
(2) The role of memory in self-consciousness
The most relevant type of memory for (1) and (2) is autobiographical memory. Section 2 will clarify the nature of autobiographical memories and judgments based on autobiographical memory. In sections 3 and 4 we will turn to an important epistemic property of autobiographical memory judgments – their immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. Understanding this property is particularly important for understanding the role of self-consciousness in memory. Section 5 explores the relation between autobiographical memory and autobiographical narrative, approaching the issue through a question posed by Bertrand Russell about the perceived pastness of autobiographical memory.
PaperRank:
This paper explores some of the areas where neuroscientific and philosophical issues intersect in.. more This paper explores some of the areas where neuroscientific and philosophical issues intersect in the study of self-consciousness. Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, the paper illustrates how the highly conceptual forms of selfconsciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoning and interpersonal psychological interactions. The study of these primitive forms of self-consciousness is an interdisciplinary enterprise and the paper considers a range of points of contact where philosophical work can illuminate work in the cognitive sciences, and vice versa.
PaperRank:
This chapter addresses a theoretical problem that arises when we treat non-linguistic animals as .. more This chapter addresses a theoretical problem that arises when we treat non-linguistic animals as thinkers in order to explain their behavior in psychological terms. Psychological explanations work because they identify beliefs and desires that show why the action in question made sense from the agent’s perspective. To say that an action makes sense in the light of an agent’s beliefs and desires is to say that it is the rational thing to do (or, at least, a rational thing to do) given those beliefs and desires. And that in turn means that, in at least some cases, an agent might reason her way from those beliefs and desires to acting in the relevant way. Most models of reasoning, however, treat it in terms of logical operations defined over linguistic structures, which makes it difficult to see how it might be extended to non-linguistic creatures. This paper develops a framework for thinking about the types of reasoning engaged in by non-linguistic creatures. It explores non-linguistic analogs of basic patterns of inference that can be understood at the linguistic level in terms of rules of inference involving elementary logical concepts. The three schemas discussed (reasoning from an excluded alternative and two types of conditional reasoning) are highly relevant to animal practical reasoning, and I show how animals might apply them without deploying any logical concepts.
PaperRank:
This is the latest revision (August 2015) of our entry on Mental Content, Nonconceptual in the St.. more This is the latest revision (August 2015) of our entry on Mental Content, Nonconceptual in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
PaperRank:
In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with wha.. more In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with what has become close to philosophical orthodoxy – the view, most often associated with John Perry (1979) and David Lewis (1979), that psychological explanations are essentially indexical. Cappelen and Dever claim that claims of essential indexicality are typically driven by intuitions rather than supported by arguments. They issue a challenge to supporters of essential indexicality: Produce an argument to back up the intuitions. This paper answers their challenge.
PaperRank:
This paper explores the connection between two approaches to reasoning and rationality that are g.. more This paper explores the connection between two approaches to reasoning and rationality that are gaining increasing prominence in the cognitive and social sciences. According to the massive modularity hypothesis, the mind is made up of a large number of specialized modules that evolved to deal with highly specific problems confronted by our hominid and pre-hominid ancestors. The theory of fast and frugal heuristics proposed by Gerd Gigerenzer and his collaborators builds upon Herbert Simon’s influential notion of bounded rationality and Simon’s idea that theories of rationality need to be sensitive to the psychology of reasoning and the constraints governing real life and real time decision-making. Both the massive modularity hypothesis and the theory of fast and frugal heuristics are proposed as drastic revisions of widely held views in cognitive science, pointing towards a notion of ecological rationality that can replace the traditional “optimizing” model of rationality. This paper assesses these revisionary claims and finds them to be overstated.
PaperRank:
Forthcoming in the second edition of the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.
PaperRank:
This paper explores and rejects Lewis’s claim that the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem a.. more This paper explores and rejects Lewis’s claim that the prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem are notational variants of each other. The first section reviews the prisoner’s dilemma and Newcomb’s problem. Section 2 explores the theoretical background to Lewis’s argument, focusing in particular on how it has been taken to support causal decision theory over standard (evidential) decision theory. Section 3 sets out Lewis’s argument. Section 4 identifies the flaw in Lewis’s argument, while section 5 compares the discussion to discussion of the so-called symmetry argument in favor of cooperating in the prisoner’s dilemma. Section 6 generalizes the discussion by showing that the two problems involve fundamentally different types of reasoning (parametric in one case, and strategic in the other), and hence that the prisoner’s dilemma cannot be a Newcomb’s problem.
PaperRank:
PaperRank:
REVIEWS 'The text is engaging, well-crafted for an undergraduate audience, and is sure to insp.. more REVIEWS
'The text is engaging, well-crafted for an undergraduate audience, and is sure to inspire a generation of students.'
--Michael J. Spivey, University of California, Merced
'This book is the most carefully written, thorough, up-to-date, and accessible single-author textbook on the theoretical issues of cognitive science I have read.'
--John Douard, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University
'Bermudez presents here an approachable story of an integrated cognitive science that may well succeed where others have failed - defining the goals and ambitions of what an introductory course in cognitive science should try to do.'
--Anthony Beavers, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Evansville, Philosophical Psychology
'This book's breadth and depth of coverage is truly impressive. Bermudez explicates the science of the mind in a sophisticated yet understandable fashion, from its traditional roots in symbol processing to exciting new advances in dynamic, embodied, and situated cognition.'
--Rob Goldstone, Professor of Psychology and Director, Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University
'The Bermudez text represents an accessible and thoughtful introduction to cognitive science.'
--Karl Haberlandt, Professor of Psychology, Trinity College, Connecticut
'..The author does a good job reminding the reader why particular material is presented.. The author has a nice touch for providing just enough detail for the reader to understand examples.. The pedagogical aids are well designed in Cognitive Science.. Each chapter includes a brief summary and a checklist.. students will appreciate the brevity of the checklists, which are simply numbered lists of key points.. Bermúdez paints a coherent picture of the field and leaves us hopeful that we can actually understand something about the mind.'
– David S. Kreiner, PsycCRITIQUES
'..The book does an admirable job of tackling its dual role as both text-book and monograph.. Bermúdez’s book is an outstanding work; it will prove to be of benefit to both students and their teachers and it makes many important contributions to several ongoing debates.
–Dr. Joel Walmsely, University College Cork, Ireland, Teorema
'..The book presents the main historical milestones of cognitive science and their particular methods, always with the aim to elucidate the connections and links between the different procedures and the whole project of understanding the mind from an information-processing point of view.. the book is highly pedagogical in the sense of preparing the reader with an overview, conveying the main discussion clearly and finally summarizing the main points. Another virtue of the book is the fact that the author indicates many internet recourses that the reader can use to continue her studies.. demonstrates how a philosopher could organize and make sense of many different ideas coming from very different domains.. it succeeds in providing a truly interdisciplinary overview that a specialized cognitive scientist could hardly supply; it is remarkable how Bermúdez moves from psychology to neuroscience, and then to robotics, mathematics or philosophy, demonstrating his general expertise in all these areas and proving to be a real cognitive scientist. This is an enlightening book which can be read with profit by all people interested in the scientific study of the mind..'
–Santiago Arango Muñoz, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Metapsychology
'The text is engaging, well-crafted for an undergraduate audience, and is sure to inspire a generation of students.'
--Michael J. Spivey, University of California, Merced
'This book is the most carefully written, thorough, up-to-date, and accessible single-author textbook on the theoretical issues of cognitive science I have read.'
--John Douard, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University
'Bermudez presents here an approachable story of an integrated cognitive science that may well succeed where others have failed - defining the goals and ambitions of what an introductory course in cognitive science should try to do.'
--Anthony Beavers, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Evansville, Philosophical Psychology
'This book's breadth and depth of coverage is truly impressive. Bermudez explicates the science of the mind in a sophisticated yet understandable fashion, from its traditional roots in symbol processing to exciting new advances in dynamic, embodied, and situated cognition.'
--Rob Goldstone, Professor of Psychology and Director, Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University
'The Bermudez text represents an accessible and thoughtful introduction to cognitive science.'
--Karl Haberlandt, Professor of Psychology, Trinity College, Connecticut
'..The author does a good job reminding the reader why particular material is presented.. The author has a nice touch for providing just enough detail for the reader to understand examples.. The pedagogical aids are well designed in Cognitive Science.. Each chapter includes a brief summary and a checklist.. students will appreciate the brevity of the checklists, which are simply numbered lists of key points.. Bermúdez paints a coherent picture of the field and leaves us hopeful that we can actually understand something about the mind.'
– David S. Kreiner, PsycCRITIQUES
'..The book does an admirable job of tackling its dual role as both text-book and monograph.. Bermúdez’s book is an outstanding work; it will prove to be of benefit to both students and their teachers and it makes many important contributions to several ongoing debates.
–Dr. Joel Walmsely, University College Cork, Ireland, Teorema
'..The book presents the main historical milestones of cognitive science and their particular methods, always with the aim to elucidate the connections and links between the different procedures and the whole project of understanding the mind from an information-processing point of view.. the book is highly pedagogical in the sense of preparing the reader with an overview, conveying the main discussion clearly and finally summarizing the main points. Another virtue of the book is the fact that the author indicates many internet recourses that the reader can use to continue her studies.. demonstrates how a philosopher could organize and make sense of many different ideas coming from very different domains.. it succeeds in providing a truly interdisciplinary overview that a specialized cognitive scientist could hardly supply; it is remarkable how Bermúdez moves from psychology to neuroscience, and then to robotics, mathematics or philosophy, demonstrating his general expertise in all these areas and proving to be a real cognitive scientist. This is an enlightening book which can be read with profit by all people interested in the scientific study of the mind..'
–Santiago Arango Muñoz, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Metapsychology
PaperRank:
Decision Theory and Rationality Abstract The concept of rationality is a common thread throug.. more Decision Theory and Rationality
Abstract
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences-from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior?
This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate.
Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did).
This controversial but accessible book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.
Book keywords
Rationality
Decision theory
Utility
Preference
Choice
Chapter 1 Decision theory and the dimensions of rationality
Abstract
This chapter begins by explaining the different explanatory projects underlying the three different dimensions of rationality (action-guiding; normative assessment; and explanatory-predictive). It then introduces the basic elements of decision theory and shows how it can serve as a theory of deliberation. It goes on to explore how, at least ion first appearances, decision theory might be employed in the projects of normative assessment and explanation/prediction. Doing this reveals three basic challenges that decision theory must confront if it is to serve as a theory of rationality. These challenges set the agenda for the main part of the book (Chapters 2 – 4).
Chapter 1 keywords
Theory of choice
Decision-making under risk
Decision-making under uncertainty
Decision making under certainty
Representation theorems
Chapter 2 The first challenge: Making sense of utility and preference
Abstract
This chapter explores how the different dimensions of rationality impose conflicting requirements and constraints upon the central notions of decision theory – the notions of utility and preference. It begins by considering the operational understanding of utility dominant in economics, according to which utility is a measure of preference (as revealed in choice). It goes on to explore different alternatives to the operational understanding. The first alternative is to develop a richer notion of preference (as in Gauthier’s theory of considered preferences). The second alternative is to reject preference as the central notion in decision theory (as in Broome’s analysis of utility in terms of goodness). It turns out that no strategy works for all three of the explanatory projects.
Chapter 2 keywords
Utility
Preference
Revealed preference
Goodness
Chapter 3 The second challenge: Individuating outcomes
Abstract
Standard presentations of decision theory adopt some version of the invariance principle (that it is irrational to assign different utilities to propositions known to be equivalent). This normative principle raises problems for the idea that decision theory can serve as a theory of motivation. Frederic Schick has responded to this tension by proposing an intensional version of decision theory that allows a single outcome to be understood in different ways (and utilities to be assigned accordingly). This raises problems (such as the failure of the expected utility theorem) that can be dealt with by a more fine-grained way of individuating outcomes (as in Broome’s theory of individuation by justifiers). Again, though, none of these strategies serves all three of the explanatory projects under consideration.
Chapter 3 keywords
Invariance principle
Intensionality
Framing effects
Substitution axiom (sure-thing principle)
Allais paradox
Chapter 4 The third challenge: Rationality over time
Abstract
This chapter explores the challenge of developing decision theory to do justice to the sequential and diachronic nature of decision making. Classical decision theory is governed by a separability principle according to which deliberation at a time is answerable only to the agent’s utility function at that time. This opens the door to forms of sequential inconsistency in which an agent makes a plan and then fails to carry it through in what is often called myopic choice. Decision theorists have proposed a number of ways of dealing with sequential inconsistency. These include models of sophisticated choice, resolute choice, and rational preference change. Each model works for some of the explanatory projects associated with the different dimensions of rationality, but none works for all.
Chapter 4 keywords
Sequential inconsistency
Myopic choice
Sophisticated choice
Resolute choice
Separability principle
Substitution axiom (sure-thing principle)
Chapter 5 Rationality: Crossing the fault lines?
Abstract
This chapter explores the relation between the different dimensions of rationality. Previous chapters have argued that decision theory cannot developed in a way that will satisfy the requirements of all three dimensions of rationality. This chapter assess the prospects for taking decision theory to be a theory of rationality in just one of the three dimensions. It evaluates Pettit’s claim that decision theory provides a normative canon of rationality, but not a deliberative calculus of rationality, as well as Kahneman and Tversky’s proposal to use prospect theory as a explanatory-predictive complement to decision theory. The upshot of the chapter is that the three dimensions of rationality cannot be separated out.
Chapter 5 keywords
Prospect theory
Belief-desire law
Folk psychology
Reasoning heuristics
Abstract
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences-from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior?
This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate.
Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did).
This controversial but accessible book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.
Book keywords
Rationality
Decision theory
Utility
Preference
Choice
Chapter 1 Decision theory and the dimensions of rationality
Abstract
This chapter begins by explaining the different explanatory projects underlying the three different dimensions of rationality (action-guiding; normative assessment; and explanatory-predictive). It then introduces the basic elements of decision theory and shows how it can serve as a theory of deliberation. It goes on to explore how, at least ion first appearances, decision theory might be employed in the projects of normative assessment and explanation/prediction. Doing this reveals three basic challenges that decision theory must confront if it is to serve as a theory of rationality. These challenges set the agenda for the main part of the book (Chapters 2 – 4).
Chapter 1 keywords
Theory of choice
Decision-making under risk
Decision-making under uncertainty
Decision making under certainty
Representation theorems
Chapter 2 The first challenge: Making sense of utility and preference
Abstract
This chapter explores how the different dimensions of rationality impose conflicting requirements and constraints upon the central notions of decision theory – the notions of utility and preference. It begins by considering the operational understanding of utility dominant in economics, according to which utility is a measure of preference (as revealed in choice). It goes on to explore different alternatives to the operational understanding. The first alternative is to develop a richer notion of preference (as in Gauthier’s theory of considered preferences). The second alternative is to reject preference as the central notion in decision theory (as in Broome’s analysis of utility in terms of goodness). It turns out that no strategy works for all three of the explanatory projects.
Chapter 2 keywords
Utility
Preference
Revealed preference
Goodness
Chapter 3 The second challenge: Individuating outcomes
Abstract
Standard presentations of decision theory adopt some version of the invariance principle (that it is irrational to assign different utilities to propositions known to be equivalent). This normative principle raises problems for the idea that decision theory can serve as a theory of motivation. Frederic Schick has responded to this tension by proposing an intensional version of decision theory that allows a single outcome to be understood in different ways (and utilities to be assigned accordingly). This raises problems (such as the failure of the expected utility theorem) that can be dealt with by a more fine-grained way of individuating outcomes (as in Broome’s theory of individuation by justifiers). Again, though, none of these strategies serves all three of the explanatory projects under consideration.
Chapter 3 keywords
Invariance principle
Intensionality
Framing effects
Substitution axiom (sure-thing principle)
Allais paradox
Chapter 4 The third challenge: Rationality over time
Abstract
This chapter explores the challenge of developing decision theory to do justice to the sequential and diachronic nature of decision making. Classical decision theory is governed by a separability principle according to which deliberation at a time is answerable only to the agent’s utility function at that time. This opens the door to forms of sequential inconsistency in which an agent makes a plan and then fails to carry it through in what is often called myopic choice. Decision theorists have proposed a number of ways of dealing with sequential inconsistency. These include models of sophisticated choice, resolute choice, and rational preference change. Each model works for some of the explanatory projects associated with the different dimensions of rationality, but none works for all.
Chapter 4 keywords
Sequential inconsistency
Myopic choice
Sophisticated choice
Resolute choice
Separability principle
Substitution axiom (sure-thing principle)
Chapter 5 Rationality: Crossing the fault lines?
Abstract
This chapter explores the relation between the different dimensions of rationality. Previous chapters have argued that decision theory cannot developed in a way that will satisfy the requirements of all three dimensions of rationality. This chapter assess the prospects for taking decision theory to be a theory of rationality in just one of the three dimensions. It evaluates Pettit’s claim that decision theory provides a normative canon of rationality, but not a deliberative calculus of rationality, as well as Kahneman and Tversky’s proposal to use prospect theory as a explanatory-predictive complement to decision theory. The upshot of the chapter is that the three dimensions of rationality cannot be separated out.
Chapter 5 keywords
Prospect theory
Belief-desire law
Folk psychology
Reasoning heuristics
PaperRank:
Reviews 'As an advanced introductory text, this book has much to recommend it to undergraduate.. more Reviews
'As an advanced introductory text, this book has much to recommend it to undergraduate and graduate philosophy students: as being clearly and engagingly written and…strking an excellent balance between exegesis and criticism…Essential reading for anyone with at least a little background in philosophy of psychology and wishes to learn more.' - Richard de Blacquiere-Clarkson, Metapsychology On Line
'a great feat…chock full of examples from contemporary research, and beginners are brought to advanced discussion of contemporary thinking about cognition. Beginning philosophers, and serious researchers in philosophy and allied fields will profit from it.'
Krista Lawlor, Philosophical Books
'An outstanding introductory text in philosophy of psychology that lends itself readily to use in a variety of courses. It will, in addition, constitute an independent, substantive contribution to philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind.' - David Rosenthal, City University of New York, USA
'Philosophers of psychology and philosophically minded psychologists are in need of just this kind of introductory book. I would recommend this material both for pedagogy and as a place for scholars to turn to for a refresher.' - Joe Cruz, Williams College, USA
'As an advanced introductory text, this book has much to recommend it to undergraduate and graduate philosophy students: as being clearly and engagingly written and…strking an excellent balance between exegesis and criticism…Essential reading for anyone with at least a little background in philosophy of psychology and wishes to learn more.' - Richard de Blacquiere-Clarkson, Metapsychology On Line
'a great feat…chock full of examples from contemporary research, and beginners are brought to advanced discussion of contemporary thinking about cognition. Beginning philosophers, and serious researchers in philosophy and allied fields will profit from it.'
Krista Lawlor, Philosophical Books
'An outstanding introductory text in philosophy of psychology that lends itself readily to use in a variety of courses. It will, in addition, constitute an independent, substantive contribution to philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind.' - David Rosenthal, City University of New York, USA
'Philosophers of psychology and philosophically minded psychologists are in need of just this kind of introductory book. I would recommend this material both for pedagogy and as a place for scholars to turn to for a refresher.' - Joe Cruz, Williams College, USA
PaperRank:
Readers Related Papers MentionsView Impact
Download
Readers Related Papers MentionsView Impact
A review of Christopher Peacocke's new book, forthcoming in the Philosophical Quarterly.
PaperRank:
Download
Readers Related Papers MentionsView Impact
PaperRank:
PaperRank:
Download
Readers Related Papers MentionsView Impact
Download
Readers Related Papers MentionsView Impact
Download
Readers Related Papers MentionsView Impact
Usual rules. Just two bonus dimensions. Find the missing value, which is denoted by a questio.. more Usual rules. Just two bonus dimensions.
Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathematics you need to know is that the area of a rectangle is the length multiplied by the width. You are not allowed to use fractions. The solution must be a whole number (but the other values not given need not be).
Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathematics you need to know is that the area of a rectangle is the length multiplied by the width. You are not allowed to use fractions. The solution must be a whole number (but the other values not given need not be).
PaperRank:
Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathema.. more Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathematics you need to know is that the area of a rectangle is the length multiplied by the width. You are not allowed to use fractions. The solution must be a whole number (but the other values not given need not be).
PaperRank:
Invented by John Conway, as reported by Laura Feiveson. This is challenging.From: New York Time.. more Invented by John Conway, as reported by Laura Feiveson. This is challenging.
From: New York Times Numberplay blog
(http://wordplay.blogs.nytimes.com/category/numberplay)
From: New York Times Numberplay blog
(http://wordplay.blogs.nytimes.com/category/numberplay)
PaperRank:
Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathema.. more Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathematics you need to know is that the area of a rectangle is the length multiplied by the width. You are not allowed to use fractions. The solution must be a whole number (but the other values not given need not be).
PaperRank:
Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathema.. more Find the missing value, which is denoted by a question mark highlighted in grey. The only mathematics you need to know is that the area of a rectangle is the length multiplied by the width. You are not allowed to use fractions. The solution must be a whole number (but the other values not given need not be).
PaperRank:
Jose Luis Clothing
In Newcomb’s problem you are presented with two boxes and have a choice between taking one of the.. more In Newcomb’s problem you are presented with two boxes and have a choice between taking one of them or both (one-boxing or two-boxing). You can see that one of the two boxes contains $1,000. The other is covered, but you know that a supernaturally good predictor has placed $1,000,000 in it if (and only if) he has predicted that you will choose to one-box. What should you do? The odds are overwhelming that if you take both boxes you will miss out on the $1,000,000. On the other hand, though, whatever the covered box contains you seem better off taking both boxes than just one.
This talk will introduce some of the issues raised by Newcomb’s problem, and discuss its relation to the much more familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma. David Lewis and others have taken the two problems to be essentially the same problem dressed up in different ways. I will present and evaluate some of the key arguments. Other topics to be covered include the differences between strategic (game-theoretic) and parametric (decision-theoretic) reasoning and what happens when each problem is iterated.
This talk will introduce some of the issues raised by Newcomb’s problem, and discuss its relation to the much more familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma. David Lewis and others have taken the two problems to be essentially the same problem dressed up in different ways. I will present and evaluate some of the key arguments. Other topics to be covered include the differences between strategic (game-theoretic) and parametric (decision-theoretic) reasoning and what happens when each problem is iterated.
PaperRank:
PaperRank:
Jose Luis Bermudez
Part of a session at the 10th Anniversary SPAWN conference on Consciousness at Syracuse Universit.. more Part of a session at the 10th Anniversary SPAWN conference on Consciousness at Syracuse University, July 29-31 2015. Schechter's paper can be found on her website at: https://pages.wustl.edu/schechter/research
Jose Luis Bermudez Arce
PaperRank: